The US catastrophe in Vietnam gave rise to the popular belief in the 1970s that presidents would hesitate to commit American troops abroad again, fearing the indignation of electorates if they became embroiled in wars and once body bags returned with American GIs. This syndrome, if it ever contributed to military inaction, was certainly short-lived.

Within five years of the end of the Vietnam War, American troops were being sent into action in Grenada, and all presidents after Carter would commit troops abroad.

A more realistic syndrome reflects an inducement to throw caution to the wind in international affairs. George Bush endeavored to counter the “wimp factor” by using force on several occasions, while Bill Clinton, who had the charge of being a draft dodger made against him during the 1992 election, proved more willing to commit American forces than any other president. After trouncing Saddam Hussein in 1991, Bush announced that Americans had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” But the syndrome (as with much of the war itself) concerns credibility something that cannot be kicked.